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T his essay explores various diverse and divergent representations of Western China1 in Chinese media and popular culture with the aim of considering how they, and their reappropriations, reproductions, and reinventions still populate 
China’s contemporary cultural landscape. In this way the essay will identify ways in which the 
peripherality of Western China has played, and continues to play, a key role in the constitution 
of mainstream Chinese popular culture. In particular, the essay will focus on examples from 
three different periods of Chinese cultural history: the Ming dynasty novel Journey to the West, 
revolutionary popular culture of the 1950s and 1960s, and cinema and television in the early post-
Mao period. 
1  Defining “Western China” is already problematic. China’s Western Development Plan (see below) designates 
Western China as the six provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan, as well 
as the five autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia. Other Chinese 
government definitions of Western China leave out Inner Mongolia and Guangxi from this list and include the 
municipality of Chongqing. However, geographically, both of these definitions include some regions—such 
as Shaanxi and Guizhou—that are actually fairly “central” in location. Some Chinese participants in the Perth 
symposium pointed out that they and, by implication, some other Chinese would consider, in their popular 
imaginary, Sichuan, Shaanxi, and some areas of the Yellow River valley to be part of “Central” China. However, 
in this essay the term “Western China” does not refer to a rigidly defined geopolitical territory, nor do I seek 
to identify the geographical boundaries of popular conceptualizations of what is or is not Western or Central 
China. Rather, I explore the discursive construction in Chinese popular culture of places in the western half 
of the country, which more or less coincide with the official government designations. Indeed, all the places I 
discuss as “Western China” fall within these official designations. However, one could also contend that this 
very ambiguity of what is “Western” and what is “Central” China only adds an additional layer of irony to the 
argument presented here. 
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I will argue that Western China has in various ways at these different times enjoyed an 
ambiguous status as simultaneously central and peripheral in China’s popular cultural history. 
This has given it unique, if greatly divergent, roles in the construction of Chinese political, cul-
tural, and historical self-understandings. Furthermore, one can identify a range of ironic tensions 
that populate many representations of Western China, suggesting that a search for a modernist 
“truth” through persuasion has been replaced by a popular culture of distraction, fragmentation, 
disjuncture, contradiction, and transience. This might be conceived of as a move from the ambig-
uous centrality of the periphery to a peripheralization of everything in the intangible realms of 
digital superficiality, inviting the question of where in China’s contemporary popular cultural 
landscape one might find space for culture critique now.
Western China is in many senses peripheral. Historically, it was considered a region of 
barbarians and foreign traders. It has many areas dominated by ethnic minorities that, with 
respect to the Han Chinese mainstream, speak different languages, adhere to different religious 
beliefs, and follow different cultural practices. More recently, Western China has been rela-
tively peripheral to the economic boom that has launched China onto the international stage as 
a major economic, political, and military power in the twenty-first century. Even if many of the 
migrant workers upon whom China’s economic growth has depended have come from Central 
and Western China’s less developed provinces, the southern and eastern coastal provinces have 
constituted the economic and manufacturing powerhouses that have driven the country’s eco-
nomic growth in recent decades. Although Western China has figured prominently in popular 
cultural representations dating back to imperial times, its particular resonances in recent decades 
constitute the main focus of this essay. Here I will consider some of the key diverse and diver-
gent representations and how they, and their reappropriations, reproductions, and reinventions 
over the years, still populate China’s contemporary cultural landscape. I will then move on to 
consider what they might tell us about key changes in the character of cultural representation in 
contemporary China. 
After an initial consideration of recent representations of Western China in contemporary 
media, I will look back first to the sixteenth-century Ming dynasty novel Journey to the West, 
which has not only made popular reading for centuries but also inspired countless films, tele-
vision series, novels, and, in recent years, video games. The second section will look at the rev-
olutionary cultural legacy of Chairman Mao and the sojourn of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in Yan’an in northwestern China. Not only were key policies formulated and developed 
during this period (from 1936 to 1948) but ideas about the “Yan’an spirit” (延安精神) and pop-
ular cultural representations of this period lived on long into the People’s Republic period, even 
to the present day. Finally, with a particular focus on cinematic and televisual representations 
from the 1980s and 1990s, I will look at the way that Western China has featured as the locus of 
cultural negotiation in the post-Mao reform period. I will argue that in each of these periods and 
through this range of diverse examples we can identify ways in which the peripherality of Western 
China has actually come to play a central role in the constitution of mainstream Chinese popu-
lar culture, making the relationship between center and periphery in this context constitutively 
ambiguous. I will suggest that irony offers a recurring tropic lens for the analysis of these “central 
peripheries” (or peripheral centers) and also question whether in contemporary Chinese popu-
lar culture there is any longer any space for “centralities” at all (peripheral or otherwise). Not so 
very long ago, truth and persuasion were at the heart of the CCP’s political and social program 
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for the country. Now the politics of representation is as much based on play as on truth and as 
much on distraction as on persuasion.
western china and internal occidentalism today
Images and representations of Western China in Chinese media today cover a range of different 
associations, from smiling, traditionally costumed, ethnic-minority peoples dancing and sing-
ing, to social unrest on the streets and terrorist attacks on train stations, to protesting monks and 
disruptive Tibetans, to corrupt politicians and high-level intrigue.2 In various ways, these rep-
resentations (and others) of Western China today constitute a form of internal “Occidentalism” 
through which various internal “Others”—often, though not always, from ethnic minorities, with 
whom Western China is often associated—constitute the springboard for the construction of 
the contemporary, modern Han Chinese self. Chen Xiaomei has written on how various Chinese 
representations of “the West,” where this refers to the global generalized “West,” have been used 
as a way of constituting China as their opposite.3 However, Occidentalism can also be applied 
to the internal western Other—the Tibetan, the Uighur, the underdeveloped, and, one might 
even argue, the deviant politician.4 Ethnic minorities (fifty-five are officially recognized) have 
long constituted the Other against which the norm of the Han mainstream has been defined.5 
Distinguished in media representations by their colorful costumes, folk songs, and dances 
(see fig. 1), these musical Others, many coming from Western China, have long populated 
the country’s television and light-entertainment schedules, not to mention tourist attractions 
ranging from the Folk Culture Village in Shenzhen to shows staged for tourists in Yunnan’s 
Xishuangbanna and elsewhere.6 As Dru Gladney put it with a touch of irony: “One cannot be 
exposed to China without being confronted by its ‘colourful’ minorities. They sing, they dance; 
they twirl, they whirl. Most of all, they smile, showing their happiness to be part of the moth-
erland.”7 However, in recent years the prominent ethnic Others of Uighurs and Tibetans in 
particular have become increasingly bound up with the politics of religion, national identity, 
and economic development. Uighurs have become associated with street violence (see fig. 2) 
and Islamic separatist terrorism instigated by outside forces,8 for instance, while noncompliant 
Tibetans are linked to the so-called Dalai Lama separatist clique. 
2  The disgraced politician Bo Xilai was the party chief of Chongqing for five years, and it was there that he met his 
political downfall in 2012. 
3  Xiaomei Chen, Occidentalism: The Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995). Cf. E. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978).
4  Aiwa Ong, “Anthropology, China and Modernities: The Geopolitics of Cultural Knowledge,” in The Future of 
Anthropological Knowledge, ed. H. Moore (London: Routledge, 1996), 83.
5  Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123.
6  See, e.g., S. Doorne, Irena Ateljievic, and Z. Bai, “Representing Identities through Tourism: Encounters of 
Ethnic Minorities in Dali, Yunnan Province, People’s Republic of China,” International Journal of Tourism 5, 
no. 1 (2003): 1–11; Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China”; and Louisa Schein, “Ethnoconsumerism as 
Cultural Production? Making Space for Miao Style,” in Locating China: Space, Place and Popular Culture, ed. Jing 
Wang (London: Routledge, 2007), 150–70.
7  Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China,” 95.
8  See, e.g., the CCTV News Channel’s News 1+1 (新闻  1+1) broadcast on May 28, 2014: “Combating Terrorism 
in China Requires Joint Internal and External Controls!” (中国反恐，需-内外兼治-！). The program, a half-
hour analytical current-affairs critique, opens with images of Uighur street violence and its aftermath followed 
by images of armies of highly trained, well-equipped, and heavily armed antiterrorist police. The program 
4  occasion
Religion has become associated in these cases with threats to national sovereignty, identity, 
and unity. At the same time, both Xinjiang and Tibet are discursively constructed as areas of 
underdevelopment in need of Han Chinese intervention.9 Complaints about Han immigration to 
these areas and the rising proportion of Han Chinese in these populations are regularly rebutted 
by the Chinese authorities with lists of infrastructure projects, economic development statistics, 
explores purported relations between domestic terrorism and the external forces inciting it (see https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=GoSSEeunhII). Another edition of the same program, on May 16, 2014, entitled “Resist 
Terrorism and Prevent Violence: A Smokeless War!” (反恐防暴：一场没有硝烟的战争！), reported on a huge 
antiterrorism exercise with similar arrays of weaponry and manpower on display. The exercises, viewers were 
told, were being staged in four places: Kunming, Guangzhou, Xinjiang, and Tibet. All, bar Guangzhou, which 
had recently suffered a widely reported Islamic terrorist attack, are in Western China (see https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=D9KUU8fABCA). 
9  Said, Orientalism. 
figure 1. 
Colorful, 
dancing ethnic-
minority people. 
figure 2. 
Protesting 
Uighurs.
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and rising educational levels.10 All of this contributes to a hegemonic discourse that constitutes 
and reproduces the Han mainstream as the norm in processes of national identification.
In fact, the whole of Western China was drawn into the discourses of underdevelopment 
from the late 1990s with the launch of the Western Development Plan (西部大开发), which 
identified six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan) and five 
autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia) and one munic-
ipal region (Chongqing) as in need of special measures to promote economic development, to 
help these areas catch up with the rapidly developing eastern provinces, and to prevent the gap 
between the two sides of the country widening even further.11 The plan has been widely discussed 
in Chinese media over the years and has featured prominently in national policy-making and 
planning, creating a dominant discursive context in which Western China was demarcated as 
different from the rest of the country and in need of special measures. The plan formed the basis 
for a range of targeted policies and development measures (such as the West–East gas pipeline 
and the Qinghai–Tibet railway) aimed at helping the region “catch up” with the rest of the coun-
try. Of course, the gap is not simply discursive—there really were and are large economic and 
developmental disparities between the two sides of the country that were becoming ever more 
marked. However, the high level of attention given to the plan nonetheless heightened awareness 
of these differences in the public realm. 
These contemporary discourses of Western China constitute these territories as periph-
eral and distinctive. Practices of internal othering and internal Occidentalist construction focus 
attention on difference and separation. However, if we first look back at previous representa-
tions of Western China in Chinese popular culture and then also consider the ways in which 
these representations still populate the contemporary popular cultural landscape, we can start 
to appreciate a more complex portrait of Western China as not only peripheral but in many ways 
also carrying a legacy of peripherality-centrality in discourses of Chinese national and cultural 
identification. 
journey to the west
The novel Journey to the West (西游记; literally, “Records of Travel to the West”) is generally 
thought to have been written in the sixteenth century and is attributed to Wu Cheng’en. It has 
become known not only in China but also worldwide through acclaimed translations by Arthur 
Waley and William Jenner and, perhaps even more importantly, through its manifestation in 
countless cinematic and televisual formats exported around the world. 
The original novel tells the story of a real Tang dynasty monk, Xuanzang, who traveled 
through Western China and neighboring territories to India in search of deeper understanding 
of Buddhist teaching. In 629 he left Chang’an (present-day Xi’an—literally, “Western peace”), 
which was then the capital of the Tang dynasty, and returned in 646, after nearly two decades of 
traveling, studying, and collecting Buddhist texts to bring back with him. However, the story of 
Xuanzang’s journey in the novel, although based on some historical fact, is also a compilation 
of fantastical characters and events derived partly from popular folk mythology and partly from 
10  June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet under the People’s Republic of China,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (2003): 411–30.
11  Nancy Huang, Joie Ma, and Kyle Sullivan, “Economic Development Policies for Central and Western China,” 
China Business Review, November 2010, http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/economic-development-
policies-for-central-and-western-china/.
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the author’s imagination. The novel largely consists of a series of adventurous episodes in which 
Xuanzang and his traveling companions—Sun Wukong, the Monkey King; Zhu Bajie, a pig 
and former general in heaven banished for misbehavior; another banished celestial general, Sha 
Wujing; and Yulong, son of the Dragon King of the West Sea—encounter a wide range of physical 
obstacles and mystical creatures, which often threaten them with some kind of mortal danger and 
from which they have to extricate themselves through combinations of guile, violence, and magic.
There are several things to note about what Western China might mean in terms of the 
Journey to the West. First of all, the parameters of center and west at the time in which the novel 
is set were quite different from those of the modern period. To start with, China’s capital in the 
Tang dynasty was Chang’an, current-day Xi’an, which is itself located in what is in contemporary 
terms considered Western China. Xi’an is the capital of today’s Shaanxi Province, one of the six 
provinces and five autonomous regions officially recognized as Western China by the Chinese 
government. This reminds us that historically “Western China” has in fact been a shifting con-
cept, and indeed in the Tang dynasty the capital was more “central,” geographically, than it has 
been in more recent times. However, at the time of the writing of the novel, in the late sixteenth 
century, China’s capital lay already in Beijing, much further to the east. Second, it is important to 
acknowledge that the ultimate destination of Xuanzang’s “journey to the west” was in fact India, 
beyond China’s borders, and indeed, much of the actual journey occurs not only in Western 
China but also in places that are today the neighboring states of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Afghanistan. However, the novel is nonetheless clearly associated with the then notions of “the 
West,” including the western regions of the Chinese sphere of influence.
The West, in this novel, is a border region (as indeed it still is), but perhaps a more import-
ant area of cultural and economic influence than today. In contemporary China the foreign is 
indeed to a large degree conceptualized in terms of a generalized “West,”12 but the route to this 
West is much less often thought of in terms of westward land travel. China’s eastern coast has in 
many ways become the conceptual departure point for reaching the foreign, especially as far as 
economic development and business is concerned.13 In Journey to the West, by contrast, the West 
constitutes the principal link to the Arab world and Europe via the Silk Route, along part of which 
Xuanzang and his companions travel. It is the direction of foreign trade, the direction from which 
foreigners come, and, significantly for this text of course, also the direction from which new reli-
gious beliefs and influences came, particularly in the shape of Buddhism.14 Consequently, the 
story of Journey to the West is about the search for a certain spiritual authenticity, the search for 
enlightenment through travels in the periphery. Although the attention in the novel—and even 
more so in many of its various media reincarnations—is quite strongly focused on the heroic and 
sometimes comic exploits of the story’s key characters, it is nonetheless a fantastic version of the 
12  Consider, for example, the use of the phrase xifangren (西方人; literally, “people for the West”) to talk about 
foreigners, including Australians and Americans, who might more logically be thought of as coming from the 
south and the east respectively. We should also note that many significant foreign “Others” in China these days 
come from the east—for example, Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and Filipinos. 
13  One might also consider the phrase xia hai (下海; literally, “go down into the sea”), used from the 1980s 
onward to refer to the decision to leave the security of state employment in order to become a private 
entrepreneur. See also below on the significance of looking out to the blue sea in relation to the Heshang 
television series. 
14  However, it is also worth noting that the Tang emperor Gaozhong was also the first to officially allow Islam to 
be practiced in China, even though Muslims had settled there earlier. Indeed, today Xi’an is recognized for its 
considerable Muslim Chinese population. 
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story of how Buddhism—a foreign religion from the West—came to be rooted more securely 
at the heart of Chinese cultural life, something that has continued, with some brief periods of 
exception, to the present day. 
However, beyond the longstanding popularity of the novel itself, for centuries the novel 
has also had a far-reaching influence on Chinese popular cultural production. The stories of the 
Monkey King and other characters from the novel have appeared countless times in Chinese 
regional operas, novels, cartoons, television series, films, and, more recently, also multiple-player 
online games. One recent count of international media adaptations of Journey to the West lists 
twenty films, eleven television series, twenty-one comic book and animé reproductions, and 
fourteen video games.15
These figures are far from complete but nonetheless offer an indication of the popularity of 
the novel and its characters as well as its ability to inspire popular cultural production, appropria-
tion, and reinvention over the decades and indeed centuries. The most recent of these adaptations 
of the Journey to the West theme includes Hong Kong comic actor and director Stephen Chow’s 
historical spoof drama Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons (2013) and Cheang Poi-soi’s 
film The Monkey King (released late in 2014). Chow’s film is a reworking that draws our attention 
to how, especially in recent years, Journey to the West has been the starting point, the source of 
inspiration, for innumerable cultural improvisations. This film is more a parodic play on themes, 
characters, and film styles (as many of Chow’s films are) than a dramatization of the novel. 
following the yan’an spirit
Journey to the West was reputedly one of Mao Zedong’s favorite classical novels as a child, engen-
dering an interest in him that he would carry into his later life.16 However, Western China was to 
appear even more prominently in Mao’s life and, consequently, in that of both the CCP and the 
Chinese nation, with long-term consequences for popular cultural production, after the Long 
March of 1936, which saw a beleaguered CCP retreat from eastern China to the relatively remote 
city of Yan’an in Shaanxi Province. Yan’an became Mao’s base between 1937 and 1948, and this 
period played a crucial role in shaping the history, mythology, and popular culture of the CCP 
for years to come. From Yan’an, Mao sought to rebuild the party, to redefine its path, and to con-
tinue the fight against the Japanese and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. At this time 
party workers and soldiers spread out into the countryside to win over Chinese peasants to their 
cause and to invest time and effort in understanding their daily lives, their cultural practices, and 
their daily challenges. In this work considerable attention was given to popular culture, which 
was seen as a crucial tool for understanding and getting close to the people while also offering 
material for future morale building and propaganda work.17 It was in relation to this work that 
in May 1942 Mao spoke to a gathering of party members and intellectuals known as the Yan’an 
Forum on Literature and Art (延安文艺座谈会). Subsequently, Mao’s lectures to the forum, 
published as Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art, were to have a profound impact on 
15  Wikipedia, s.v. “List of media adaptations of Journey to the West,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of 
_media_adaptations_of_ Journey_to_the_West (accessed 2015).
16  Dong Zhixin, Mao Reads “Journey to the West” [Mao Zedong du xi you ji 毛泽东读西游记] (Liaoning: Liaoning 
Pictorial Publishing House, 2011).
17  Bonnie S. MacDougall, Mao Zedong’s “Talk at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art”: A Translation of the 
1943 Text with Commentary (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1980).
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popular cultural production throughout China for more than three decades following the estab-
lishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. 
Mao’s Talks, which were aimed at unifying party policy on cultural production, made two 
key points. First, in what can be seen as an anti-elitist move, artists should take seriously workers, 
peasants, and soldiers both as inspirational sources for artistic production and as audiences for 
their work. Second, Mao stipulated that all artistic production should serve a political purpose: 
namely, the promotion of socialism and what would later become known as Marxism–Leninism–
Mao Zedong Thought. Mao’s Talks were to have an immediate and lasting impact on cultural and 
artistic production. Folk stories, music, and dance were reevaluated, artistic production spoke 
to and for the “masses” (群众), and political messages became increasingly entrenched in litera-
ture, theater, music, and other types of artistic production, culminating in the rigid application 
of these ideas by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when 
only a small number of prescribed model operas could be performed in the country. Mao’s Talks 
effectively subordinated cultural production to politics until the 1980s. 
However, the effect of the Talks was only part of the Yan’an legacy that survives to this day. 
The “Yan’an Spirit” (延安精神) or the “Yan’an Way” (延安作风), as the idea has come to be 
known, refers to the sense of sacrifice, socially oriented collective effort, hard work, enthusiasm 
for the party and its objectives, and the striving for the realization of socialism against all odds 
that characterized many party workers of the period, especially the survivors of the Long March, 
and has since entered into the party’s own mythology. Calls to study the Yan’an Spirit became 
repetitive themes in speeches, media, and poster campaigns both during and after the Yan’an 
period (see figs. 3 and 4). 
figure 3. Poster with the exhortation 
“Study the Yan’an Way, develop a 
revolutionary tradition” (1962).
figure 4. “Long live the Yan’an Way” 
(1961).
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Following the Communist victory in the civil war and the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the party and its central administration, media organizations, and 
leaders all moved to Beijing and other parts of the country. However, the legacy of Yan’an and the 
Long March endured, with the spirit of Yan’an still being invoked today. The Yan’an Spirit was a 
common theme in revolutionary films of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, perhaps best epitomized by 
the biopic Dr. Bethune, which was made in 1964 and recounts the life of Canadian-born doctor 
Norman Bethune, who devoted himself to China’s rural population in the Yan’an years. Mao’s 
eulogy for the doctor, originally written in 1939, became compulsory learning in Chinese primary 
schools in the 1960s, and excerpts can still be found in textbooks today.18
The 1964 film, directed by Zhang Junxiang, Gao Zheng, and Li Shutian, has been viewed 
over the years by hundreds of millions of people throughout the country, especially since it has 
been shown at regular intervals on Chinese television since the 1980s. Bethune became the cin-
ematic embodiment of the Yan’an Spirit. As Mao himself put it: 
Comrade Bethune’s spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown 
in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all com-
rades and the people. . . . We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With 
this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man’s ability may be great or small, but 
if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above 
vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.19
Some of the filmmakers of the 1964 feature film had also worked on a 1939 documentary on 
Norman Bethune produced by the newly formed Yan’an Film Group, the first film propaganda 
organization of the CCP, which made various films about life in Yan’an. One of these, Nanniwan 
(1942), told the story of an agricultural cooperative set up in the region of the Nanniwan Gorge, 
about 90 kilometers from Yan’an, which was later hailed as a success and model for future col-
lective effort and collaboration. 
In 1943 a revolutionary song of the same name was written by the poet He Jingzhi and 
became one of the most widely known songs in China for decades to come. The song—an exam-
ple perhaps of what Brady calls “revolutionary romanticism of the Mao period”—urges people 
to come to Nanniwan to see the transformation from a barren mountain into a rural agricul-
tural idyll.20 A good theatrical example of such revolutionary romanticism can be seen in Lan 
Guoying’s (郭兰英) 1965 rendition of the song.21 In this highly choreographed spectacle, stylized 
peasants and soldiers, the girls carrying baskets of colorful flowers, swing gently in time to the 
music and stream around the stage in traditional Chinese theater fashion while providing choral 
punctuation and accompaniment.22
18  For English-speaking audiences around the world it was another foreigner, Edgar Snow, who spread the word of 
Yan’an and the Communist revolution, through his book Red Star over China. 
19  Mao Zedong, “In Memory of Norman Bethune,” in Serve the People (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966). 
20  Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 2.
21  Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBDMT57SpD8.
22  What the song does not mention is that the agricultural cooperative was cultivating opium poppies as a means 
of raising much-needed hard cash for the war effort. See James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise of the 
Military-Business Complex in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1978–1998 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
2001), 32–33.
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The importance of these representations of Yan’an has not diminished over time. Even if 
their political and cultural context has been transformed, especially in the last three decades, 
these representations have not been left behind in a mummified Maoist past. On the contrary, 
a postmodern nostalgia (which has seen the reappropriation of Maoist imagery23 and even the 
popularity of Cultural Revolution experience themed restaurants in Beijing) and the continu-
ing political manipulation and reinvention of the revolutionary past by the CCP have led to the 
revitalization, reappropriation, and reinvention of these representations from the past, even to 
the present day. 
However, the CCP has not been alone in reappropriating this piece of Yan’an cultural her-
itage. In the early 1990s, following the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Cui Jian, the so-called 
father of Chinese rock music, then considered by the authorities cautiously as somewhat sub-
versive, sang the song “Nanniwan” in his own style at concerts in Beijing and elsewhere, perfor-
mances that can now be relived online through Youku, YouTube, and other video websites and 
that add another layer of complex reference to this history of reappropriations of the revolution-
ary past. In one slow and pensive acoustic set from the mid-1990s, we can see shots of the audience 
clapping and singing along loudly at Cui’s behest, revealing their familiarity and enthusiasm for 
the song, even if one is left uncertain about the motives for their appreciation of the performance 
(see more below).24
In 2012 Chinese film director Diana Peng produced a new film with the same title 
(Nanniwan) recounting once again for contemporary audiences and with contemporary film 
technologies the story of the valiant efforts of the Eighth Route Army in Yan’an back in the 1940s. 
Meanwhile, in 2004 the Chinese central government launched an effort to promote “red tour-
ism,” which has brought thousands of visitors to Yan’an. According to Yan’an tourism officials, 
the city attracted 14.5 million tourists in 2010, bringing in revenues of Rmb7.65 billion (around 
US$1.17 billion), with more than a thousand viewers daily of the tourist reconstruction of the 
“Battle Defending Yan’an.”25 
In 2006 China Central Television (CCTV) also produced Norman Bethune, a twenty-epi-
sode series retelling once again the life and times of the famous Canadian physician, concentrat-
ing particularly on his time in China. The series, costing some Rmb30 million, was reported to 
be the most expensive television drama series ever made in China up to that date.26 Also in 2006, 
Yin Li’s film Zhang Side, a biopic of a Yan’an period soldier hero who worked in Nanniwan, among 
other places, swept China’s most prestigious film awards, the Golden Rooster Awards, with actor 
Wu Jun winning best actor for playing Zhang, Yin Li winning best director, and the film taking 
best film.27 Just how these films and songs are transformed, adapted, and reappropriated and the 
cultural significance of these practices could be the theme of another essay, and it is beyond the 
23  See Geremie R. Barme, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
24  Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bErB2cCisHM.
25  In this private, commercially operated tourist attraction, complete with gunpowder smoke and the sound of 
gunshots, tourists get to dress up as soldiers and participate in the reconstruction of a famous 1947 battle in 
which the Communist forces repelled an effort by the Nationalists to drive them out of their revolutionary base. 
“China Focus: Red Tourism Flourishes in Old Revolutionary Bases” (Beijing: Xinhua News Agency, 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/14/c_13874806.htm (accessed November 27, 2015).
26  “Sixty-Seven Years On, Canadian Idealist Moves China Again,” People’s Daily, August 31, 2006, http://
en.people.cn/200608/31/eng20060831_298507.html (accessed November 19, 2015).
27  Yu Sen-lun, “Zhang Side Dominates Top Chinese Awards,” Screen Daily, October 29, 2006, http://www.
screendaily.com/zhang-side-dominates-top-chinese-awards/4029325.article (accessed November 19, 2015).
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scope of the present discussion to explore this further. However, what all these examples show is 
that Yan’an lives on as an important and recurring theme in Chinese popular culture. From the 
1940s, and particularly with the Communist victory in 1949, Western China in the guise of the 
trope of Yan’an has remained central to China’s mediated “popular reality.”28
Yan’an assumed a metonymic role at the center of the semiosphere that is CCP mythology. 
What is more, one might argue that it is precisely because of the marginality of Yan’an, the fact 
that after 1949 it was in many ways left behind only to continue its existence in the realm of CCP 
mythology,29 that it managed to maintain this centrality in popular culture. It is the detachment 
from the continuing reality of CCP and national politics that preserved its tropic status. Yan’an 
remained the symbolic locus of the revolutionarily idyllic past relatively untainted by the fol-
lowing political intrigues, campaigns, and infighting that characterized the future of the party 
in Beijing. Indeed, it was precisely at times of crisis or heightened political tension such as the 
Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution that Yan’an—and we might also add the more 
recent promotion of red tourism and remakes of revolutionary films—would be rolled out as a 
reminder of what was at stake, what the point of the revolution had been, and what was expected 
of ordinary citizens in their daily lives. It is this function, devoid of its original political and his-
torical context, that has enabled Yan’an to be used, or referred to, in such a way that “[s]ymbols 
from the Maoist past are now used to evoke images of nostalgia and support without retaining 
the substance of their original meaning.”30 In the end it is Yan’an’s peripherality—its geographical 
distance and its ability to become detached from the more complex and painful associations of 
Mao’s China—that has ensured its continuing centrality in China’s popular cultural landscape. 
revisiting the revolutionary west
In the 1980s, with the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policies, Chinese intellec-
tual debate flourished in a way that it had not done for decades, with a new atmosphere of relative 
freedom and openness characterizing a reinvigorated realm of cultural negotiation—what was 
known then as “culture fever” (文化热).31 It was at this time that the so-called “fifth generation” 
of Chinese filmmakers emerged from the Beijing Film Academy, largely under the patronage of 
the older director Wu Tianming at the Xi’an Film Studios and most notably led by future block-
buster and internationally renowned directors Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou.32 However, many 
others deserve equal credit for their role in the revolution in Chinese filmmaking, including Tian 
Zhuangzhuang, Wu Ziniu, Huang Jianxin, Hu Mei, and Zhang Junzhao. These fifth-generation 
28  John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism and Popular Culture (New York: Arnold, 1996).
29  Liangyu Hu, “A City in Retold Myth: The Changing Image of Yan’an in Chinese Revolutionary Memory and 
Narrative” (MA diss., SOAS, University of London, 2012).
30  Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 3. Another way of putting this might be to say that such popular cultural relics 
have become simulacra (cf. J. Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman 
[New York: Semiotext(e), 1983]) operating only in the realm of recycled and mutually referential signs through 
which China’s revolutionary past is so often experienced today.
31  See also Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
32  See Chris Berry, ed., Perspectives on Chinese Cinema (London: BFI, 1991); Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, 
Vivian Sobchack, and Esther Yau, eds., New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Paul Pickowicz, “Velvet Prisons and the Political Economy of Chinese 
Filmmaking,” in Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao 
China, ed. Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, and Elizabeth J. Perry, Woodrow Wilson Center 
Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 193–220. 
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filmmakers employed a wide range of styles and subject matter, but a certain number of these 
films, particularly the earlier ones and those by some of the most prominent filmmakers, dis-
played some common themes and used similar devices in their interrogation of Chinese cul-
ture. It is beyond the scope of this essay to detail all the issues and arguments involved, but some 
of them are pertinent here. Most notably, a number of films used depictions of China’s remote, 
often Western, regions as a vehicle for interrogating Chinese cultural modernity, experimenting 
with new ideas of film language and escaping the clichés of previous Chinese films. As Zhang 
Xudong put it:
In the major Fifth Generation films, where the norm of socialist realism is visually disman-
tled in the name of a higher realism (the ontology of the photographic image), the new reality 
encountered by the new perspective in a new optical situation takes form in the marginal or resid-
ual realms of nature (the Yellow River, the Tibetan Plateau, the Mongolian grassland, the mountain 
village in Yunnan), the archaic, the mythic or the utopian.33
So, for example, Tian Zhuangzhuang’s Horse Thief and On the Hunting Ground were set in Tibet 
and Mongolia respectively; Chen Kaige’s King of the Children was based on a short story by 
Ah Cheng set in southwestern China’s remote mountainous villages of the border province of 
Yunnan; and the same director’s Yellow Earth, described by Zhang as the “aesthetic and political 
manifesto of the Fifth Generation” and the “archetype of the genre of Chinese cinematic mod-
ernism,” is set in the loess plains of the Yellow River near Yan’an.34 
Yellow Earth, released in 1984, was Chen Kaige’s directorial debut film, made with Zhang 
Yimou as cinematographer. The film returned Chinese audiences once again to Shaanxi and 
the Yan’an period. However, this time it was with a difference. Although the film is about a 
Communist Party soldier from Yan’an collecting folk songs as part of the party project to learn 
from the people, the film offers a representation of the period, its politics, and its peasantry that 
starkly contrasts with what we find in, for instance, Nanniwan.
In Yellow Earth Chen set out to deliberately challenge the conventions of Chinese filmmak-
ing as they were known at the time. There were to be no joyful dancing peasants, no Communist 
Party heroes, no sloganeering or propaganda. Rather, in this slow, contemplative, highly visual 
film with a simple narrative structure—almost to the point of not having one—one is invited 
to reflect upon the achievements of the CCP and how far, viewed from the 1980s, the party had 
lived up to its expectations. 
Zhang Xudong’s masterful analysis of the film draws our attention to a new kind of decen-
tering.35 Zhang argues that Chen Kaige’s and Zhang Yimou’s appropriation of the heavy, yellow 
landscape is used as a way of escaping the spatial construction of temporality in the socialist 
realist films of the past: 
What is smashed by the presentation of this landscape, though, is not a temporality per se, 
but rather the narrativity of time inscribed in a particular mode of representation, the official, 
33  Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-garde Fiction, and the New 
Chinese Cinema (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 243 (emphasis added).
34  Ibid., 247.
35  Ibid., 246–65.
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bureaucratized discourse of socialist realism. The seizure of cinematic space by this landscape, 
then, introduces . . . an entire historical age crying for representation.36 
In this film Western China becomes the repository of a feudal, unchanging, traditional past: 
a place where young girls are married off to older men against their will,37 where poverty is inter-
mingled with folk culture in shaping farmers’ everyday lives and experiences. Standing for this 
onerous cultural burden, here we find the landscape of Western China as much a part of the prob-
lem as the solution. Indeed, one reading of Yellow Earth would lie in its identification of the failure 
or inability of the CCP, despite all its promises, to overcome the inertia of Chinese traditional-
ity represented by the intricately intertwined characteristics of earth, landscape, economy, and 
cultural practice.38 Pushing Zhang Xudong’s point further, what we find here is Western China 
deployed as the battering ram that reveals the disingenuousness of its previous representations 
from Nanniwan to Dr. Bethune. What is revealed is how Western China actually disappeared 
behind the clichés of what Mitter has called the “Mao-centred historiography which placed the 
Yan’an base area at the centre of the permitted narrative.”39 
This theme of a burdensome, physically and geographically rooted culture standing some-
how between the Chinese people and modernity recurs, more explicitly stated, in the 1988 tele-
vision series Heshang (River Elegy), which was aired nationally on the eve of the Tiananmen 
demonstrations and was subsequently associated with, and heavily criticized for, fanning the 
flames of intellectual discontent that the demonstrations represented.40 
In one episode of Heshang, China is contrasted with a generalized “West.” China is por-
trayed as a yellow, earth-bound culture suggesting rootedness, closed-mindedness, and some 
degree of introversion; whereas the West is depicted as blue, seafaring, exploratory, inquisitive, 
and open.41 However, what is interesting from the point of view of this essay is the identification 
and depiction of China’s earth-bound rootedness. The “yellowness” of this inertia is drawn from 
the same loess plains of the Yellow River valley where Chen Kaige filmed his feudally encum-
bered peasantry, not far from either the revolutionary capital of Yan’an or the Tang dynasty 
capital of Chang’an (now Xi’an). The Yellow River valley has a further historical and cultural 
significance in China as the site of some of the earliest archaeological traces of Chinese culture. 
The Yellow River basin is sometimes, in fact, referred to as the “cradle of Chinese civilization.” 
Consequently, in these depictions of Western China (in Yellow Earth and Heshang) we find a 
36  Ibid., 251.
37  See also Lewis Mayo, “Images of ‘Feudal Marriage’ in Recent Chinese Art Films,” in Modernization of the 
Chinese Past, ed. Mabel Lee and A. D. Syrokomla-Stefanowska (Broadway, Australia: Wild Peony / Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1993), 137–51.
38  We should also acknowledge the links of the fifth-generation group of filmmakers to the May Fourth 
Movement and to similar critiques of Chinese traditional culture from authors as diverse as Lu Xun, Yu Dafu, 
and Shen Congwen. See, e.g., Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee, eds., An Intellectual History of Modern 
China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
39  Rana Mitter, “Old Ghosts, New Memories: China’s Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 1 (2003): 119.
40  See, e.g., “ʻHe shang’ de wu qu: cong ‘he shang’ dao ‘wu si’”《河殇》的误区 : 从《河殇》到《五四》 
[The mistakes of “River Elegy”: From “River Elegy” to “May 4th”] (Zhong gong zhong yang xuan chuan bu wen 
hua yi shu ju ying shi chu bian, 1990) [published by the Film and Television Office of the Literature and Art 
Bureau of the Central Ministry of Propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party, 1990].
41  Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, Deathsong of the River: A Reader’s Guide to the Chinese TV Series “Heshang,” 
trans. Richard W. Bodman and Pin P. Wan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 203–22, 249–69; and 
Chen, Occidentalism. 
14  occasion
questioning, a problematization, and an interrogation of this cultural yellowness. These por-
trayals of the central role of the Yellow River’s loess plains in the formation of Chinese cultural 
identity suggest a need for decentering, for looking elsewhere for positive inspirations, and, in 
line with an intellectual tradition dating back to at least the May Fourth Movement, for critically 
appraising China’s cultural heritage rooted in this part of Western China.42 
conclusion
I have argued here that Western China has in various ways and at different times enjoyed an 
ambiguous status as simultaneously central and peripheral in China’s popular cultural history, a 
status that has given it unique, if greatly divergent, roles in the construction of Chinese political, 
cultural, and historical self-understandings. I have argued that there is an internal Occidentalism 
that works to support a Han mainstream hegemony through ideological representations. This 
tends to work toward a separation of the western regions—the west is the Other, distinct and 
separate and often the negative of the Han—which are seen as religious, feudal, violent, dis-
ruptive, threatening, backward, underdeveloped, uneducated, and in need of Han-centric state 
support/development and intervention.43 However, despite this separation, this marginalization 
and peripheralization, compounded by geographical and physical marginality or peripherality, 
Western China has played key roles at different times in the construction, negotiation, evalua-
tion, and reevaluation of mainstream cultural identities in China.
With Journey to the West and its tale of the search for enlightenment in the periphery of 
the Chinese sphere of influence, we see a lasting and highly influential inspiration for popular 
cultural production, which has exploded with the arrival of electronic and subsequently digital 
media. In this we can already identify a certain ambiguous centrality of the periphery. There is 
a certain irony surrounding the centrality of Journey to the West, following Kenneth Burke’s use 
of the term, in that irony holds together two contending perspectives—“a tension of difference 
and an attempt to see two sides together.”44 This book, which has become a key Chinese cultural 
marker, is focused on a group of people leaving China and traveling to the West in search of 
greater cultural enlightenment. I want to argue that this kind of irony is also, even if in very dif-
ferent ways, a recurring theme in other representations of Western China that have also proven 
central through their peripherality.
With Yan’an in revolutionary culture, the irony is that this mythical center, this trope of 
self-sacrifice and devotion to the cause, (a) was left behind when power moved to Beijing and (b) 
came about as a result of a forced retreat, the Long March, from Eastern China. What is more, 
as we have seen, ironically it is Yan’an’s historical peripherality that has enabled it to retain this 
ideological force over the decades.
However, irony can also be found in some of the more recent reappropriations of the Yan’an 
legacy. Consider Cui Jian’s rendition of “Nanniwan,” for instance, which is full of irony. Is he 
42  Incidentally, we might also note that Xuanzang set out from this same part of China in search of Buddhist 
enlightenment some fourteen centuries earlier. 
43  Cf. also Mark Hobart, ed., An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (London: 
Routledge, 1990). 
44  Hans Steinmüller, “The State of Irony in China,” Critique of Anthropology 31, no. 1 (2011): 34. See also Hans 
Steinmüller and Suzanne Brandtstädter, eds., Irony, Cynicism and the Chinese State (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2016); and Kenneth Burke, “The Four Master Tropes” (1941), in A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969).
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truly praising and being nostalgic for the Mao period? Is he suggesting that the CCP should 
look back to its roots and reacquire those values? Or is he satirizing, parodying, or poking fun at 
the dogmatic propaganda of the past? And in any of these cases, what is the nature of the audi-
ence’s enthusiastic clapping and singing along? Is that a sign of appreciation for Cui Jian’s irony 
or parody? Or is it perhaps just simply ironic (in another sense, another layer of irony) that they 
don’t understand Cui Jian’s irony and indeed sing along simply because they know the song so 
well? We cannot of course answer these questions, but the fact that we can—indeed, perhaps, 
must—ask them if we are to try to determine what was going on in this performance is enough 
to reveal layers of irony involved. 
With culture fever and fifth-generation cinema there is further irony. Yellow Earth 
is replete with irony: it deals with a classic propaganda theme—an Eighth Route Army 
soldier during the Yan’an period collecting folk songs, inspiring a young girl to the cause, 
and so on—but it is handled in such a completely different way that it pulls open the cur-
tain on everything that has been hidden by the clichés of these themes in past represen-
tations. What is ironic here is that Western China is used—again for, in, and through its 
peripherality—to offer a critique of both the weight of Chinese traditions and the CCP’s 
promises, abilities, and achievements. This is done, furthermore, using a style and a theme 
that are utterly reminiscent of May Fourth literature—the culture critique of Lu Xun in 
The True Story of Ah Q and New Year’s Sacrifice,45 of the young girl in Shen Congwen’s 
Girl from Hunan, or the protagonist in Yu Dafu’s Sinking or in Lao She’s Camel Xiangzi. 
The cultural critique found in this literature in many ways formed the intellectual roots 
of left-wing movements, including the CCP, from the 1920s onward.46 
This critique looks at the enduring influence of “feudal” Chinese culture and the weight 
and burden of Chinese tradition—something pursued further in Heshang, where a further irony 
arises. In this television series, the Yellow River valley, part of Western China considered to be 
the cradle of Chinese civilization, is deployed as a metonym for the rooted, introverted cultural 
burden that Chinese culture had become in a modernizing world (again themes highly remi-
niscent of May Fourth period writing). One might argue again that it is the relatively remote 
peripherality of the Yellow River valley that makes such a critique possible. Although the pro-
gram got into trouble—and has subsequently all but disappeared from China’s explicitly voiced 
cultural heritage—it might never have been broadcast if this critique had been focused on, say, 
the Forbidden City or other places or personalities much closer to contemporary centers of power 
in China. 
Journey to the West, by contrast, is thriving in the contemporary popular cultural landscape. 
The novel’s story, its comic demeanor, and its diverse reappropriations in recent decades (not 
to mention previously in theater, literature, etc.) all lend themselves to the ludic, carnivalesque 
superficiality of contemporary digital consumer culture, which has an insatiable appetite for con-
tent. Consequently, Journey to the West, perhaps like Yan’an and Nanniwan in their own ways, has 
45  Both short stories are in Lu Xun: Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980).
46  This style of critique continues through fifth-generation films such as Ju Dou, Raise the Red Lantern, etc. Rey 
Chow traces the link between the critical approaches of the May Fourth Movement and fifth-generation 
cinema through her notion of the “visuality” of Chinese culture. Rey Chow, Primitive Passions: Visuality, 
Sexuality, Ethnography and Contemporary Chinese Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
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become a simulacrum in Baudrillard’s sense of the word47—its various representations, realiza-
tions, and manifestations refer as much to each other as to any original story or novel. 
However, perhaps the biggest irony of all is that contemporary popular culture in China is 
so fundamentally fragmented, disjointed, contradictory, and transitory that all these critiques 
from the 1980s and early 1990s now seem so dated, so unnecessary, and so distant from so many 
people’s daily practices. In contemporary China, consumerism has in so many ways taken over 
from, or at least subdued, ideas; and culture critique (i.e., the politicized interrogation of one’s 
own cultural heritage and production), which was in any case largely wiped from China’s intel-
lectual landscape following the events of 1989, has become a thing of the past. Early fifth-gener-
ation films now sit—alongside pop stars, celebrity intellectuals, cheap TV dramas, reality TV 
shows, and digital games—on the digital shelves of Chinese consumers’ electronic devices, the 
remnants of a now-forgotten modernist discourse in a postrevolutionary, postmodern world.48 
Fifth-generation films are barely known among young people and have become simply some (a 
few of the least popular at that) among many other entertainment options in the fragmented 
postmodern landscape of contemporary Chinese popular culture—where incidentally the car-
nivalesque of Journey to the West has thrived.49 The cultural center of Chinese popular culture 
seems to have shifted from the ambiguously central periphery to the intangible realms of digi-
tal superficiality, where the excess of information removes even the conditions of possibility for 
culture critique. 
47  Baudrillard, Simulations.
48  All these various representations have been detached from their original contexts of production, despite their 
contradictions and mutual incompatibilities—a phenomenon that Peter Sloterdijk has associated with an age 
of cynical reason. See Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987). But that is another story.
49  Cf. David Kurt Herold and Peter Marolt, eds., Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating and 
Instrumentalising the Online Carnival (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
